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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dale Francis Crooks appeals from his judgment and sentence entered
upon his conviction of possession of a controlled substance at trial. Specifically,
Crooks challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state filed an Information charging Crooks with possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp. 68-69.) Crooks filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the search that
led to the discovery of the methamphetamine violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and Article I,

5

17 of the Idaho Constitution.

(R., pp. 72-73.)

Specifically, Crooks contended that the frisk of his person was unconstitutional
because the agent who conducted the frisk had no specific or articulable facts
that Crooks was armed or dangerous. [R.?pp. 125-26.)
At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that Kristopher Eby, a
resident of the home where the Crooks was located, was on felony probation and
that his probation included a term that he would submit to searches of his
personal property, automobile, and residence without a search warrant at the
request of his probation officer. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 4-1 1.) The parties also stipulated
that a search warrant was authorized for the residence. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-22.)
The state then presented the following uncontested facts:

Sergeant

Hildebrant of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office received a telephone call from
Ruth Brownlee, a probation officer, who told him that one of her probationers,

Kristopher Eby, was selling methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 3.)
Brownlee told Hildebrant that Eby was harassing Katie Kelly for money that she
owed him for past methamphetamine purchases.

(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 22-25.)

Sergeant Hildbrant also learned that because Eby was on probation, he would
not keep methamphetamine at his home but that Dale Crooks would keep it for
him, and that Eby would contact Crooks to bring him the methamphetamine
when making a sale. (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 2-7.)
Sergeant Hildebrant contacted Kelly and arranged for her to make a
controlled purchase from Eby. (Tr., p. 15, L. 8 - p. 17, L. 3.) She was fitted with
a transmitter and given money to purchase methamphetamine from him. (Tr., p.
17, Ls. 3-13.) At Eby's residence, Kelly purchased methamphetamine from Eby,
who had just purchased it from his neighbor, Tom. (Tr, p. 18, Ls. 21-25.) After
leaving Eby's residence, Kelly turned the methamphetamine over to Sergeant
Hildebrant. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 6-10.)
Based on the controlled purchase and information from Kelly, Sergeant
Hildebrant requested that officers go to Eby's residence and secure the premises
in anticipation of a search warrant. (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 15-21.) Shortly thereafter,
while waiting for the search warrant to be issued, probation officer Brownlee and
assisting officers, including Special Agent Sotka of the FBI, entered the
residence pursuant to the terms of Eby's probation, detained and handcuffed all
of the occupants, and patted down the occupants for officer safety. (Tr., p. 41, L.
2 - p. 48, L. 6.) Crooks was present in the residence and was also handcuffed
and patted down. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 9-22.) During the pat down of Crooks, Agent

Sotka detected an object in Crooks' pants pocket. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 18-20.) Agent
Sotka asked Crooks if the object was anything .that could be used to harm the
officers. (Tr., p. 47, L. 25 - p. 48, L. 6.) Crooks replied that it was a pipe and told
the agent that he could remove it from his pocket. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-19.) Upon
removing the pipe, Agent Sotka placed it on the table (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 9-10.)
Shortly thereafter, Crooks was arrested. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 7-12.)
At the suppression hearing, both Sergeant Hildebrant and Agent Sotka
testified that weapons are commonly associated with narcotics, and that the use
of weapons is becoming more common. (Tr., p. 23, L. 9 - p. 26, L. 10; p. 55, L.
17 - p. 56, L. 13.) Agent Sotka further testified that a large percentage of the
felonies that are committed are violent crime offenses, and that the FBI classifies
drug dealings as violent crime offenses. (Tr., p. 56, L. 18 - p. 57, L. 3.)
After the suppression hearing and after hearing argument from the parties,
the district court denied Crooks1motion to suppress, ruling:
Again, in the particular instance, the officer that conducted
the pat down of Mr. Crooks had knowledge that a narcotics
transaction had just taken place in that apartment, in that
residence, in a reasonable time period before the detention and the
pat down. That it is not uncommon, in fact, it is not at all
uncommon, it is usual, it is frequent for those who are involved in
the sale or the delivery of drugs to be armed in some way. And that
it is not unusual for persons who have been ingesting
methamphetamine to be aggressive individuals. And there was
evidence that persons in that particular residence had been
ingesting methamphetamine, that they may be more aggressive
persons. All of the reasons led it to being a reasonable precaution
by law enforcement to conduct the pat of Mr. Crooks outside of his
clothing.

At trial, a jury found Crooks guilty of both possession of methamphetamine
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p. 191.) The district court imposed a
unified 4 year sentence with 2 years fixed, suspended execution of the sentence,
and placed Crooks on 3 years probation.
appealed. (R., pp. 215-17.)

(R., pp. 208-12.)

Crooks timely

ISSUES
Crooks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in holding that Agent Sotka's frisk of
Crooks' was objectively reasonable where the evidence admitted at
the suppression hearing showed that Agent Sotka's conduct in
frisking Crooks was not based on any articulable facts to believe
Crooks was presently armed and dangerous.
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Crooks failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT
Crooks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Crooks asserts that the weapons frisk conducted by Agent Sotka violated

his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 5-7.) Crooks does not challenge the validity of his initial detention.
Rather, he argues that the pat-down search was unconstitutional because Agent
Sotka did not have particularized suspicion that Crooks was presently armed or
dangerous. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Crooks' claim fails and the district court
correctly denied his motion to suppress. Agent's Sotka's conduct in frisking
Crooks' for weapons was a constitutionally reasonable measure taken for officer
safety.
B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The

appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135
(2005); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000).
C.

Crooks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied
His Motion To Suppress
An officer has the authority to conduct a limited, self-protective pat down

search for weapons while conducting an inquiry pursuant to a lawful investigative

detention. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); State v. Rawlings, 121
ldaho 930, 934, 829 P.2d 520, 524 (1992). An officer may frisk an individual if
the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonably
prudent person to believe the individual with whom the officer is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel this belief. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State v. Babb,
133 ldaho 890, 892, 994 P.2d 633, 635 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Fleenor, 133
ldaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). In analyzing a frisk, the
reviewing court looks to facts known to the officer on the scene and the
inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of those specific
circumstances. Babb, 133 ldaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 ldaho at
555, 989 P.2d at 787. See also State v. Muir, 116 ldaho 565, 567-68, 777 P.2d
1238, 1240-41 (Ct. App. 1989).
As an initial matter, there was no testimony that Agent Sotko observed
any suspicious bulges on Crooks, that Crooks had a known reputation for
violence, or that he acted in a threatening manner.

See

State v. Bishop, 146

ldaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009) (noting factors supporting
reasonable belief that an individual would be armed).

However, courts have

regularly recognized the danger faced by officers when confronting drug
enterprises and have frequently validated measures to increase officer safety in
these situations even where other indicia that a suspect is armed and dangerous
are absent. An individual's proximity to or involvement with drug transactions or
distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual in

circumstances where the use of such techniques normally would not have been
valid had the nature of the suspected criminal activity been considered less
prone to violence. See e.q., United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1194-95
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding a frisk was valid where the officer "reasonably
suspected that Johnson might be involved in drug dealing, kidnapping, or
prostitution" which are crimes "typically associated with some sort of weapon,
often guns"); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005)
("Because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug
transactions, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a person may be armed
and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug
transaction."); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1086
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Because the police reasonably suspected [the defendant] of
dealing in narcotics, it was not unreasonable to believe that he might be
armed."); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) ( " V l h e n [an]
officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in [a] vehicle, the officer
may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants
out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons" given that "the
indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable
suspicion of danger to the officer."); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171,
1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a frisk of vehicle occupants was reasonable
where an officer had observed large amounts of money on the front seat,
believed that it was drug money, and became concerned for his safety "because
persons involved with drugs often carry weapons"); State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d

1008, 1010 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the fact that officers "knew that people involved
in the manufacture and transportation of [methamphetamine] commonly carry
weapons" was part of justification for the frisk). This proposition is supported by
Terry itself where the Supreme Court recognized it was reasonable to assume
from the nature of the offense contemplated that Terry was armed and
dangerous even though the officer had not observed a weapon or any physical
indication of a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
The Idaho court of appeals followed suit in State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246,
76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003). Having received consent to search the premises
from a home's occupants who were being held on suspicion of manufacturing
methamphetamine, an officer immediately frisked Dreier who emerged from the
house prior to the officers' entrance. Dreier, 139 ldaho at 248-49, 76 P.3d at
992-93.

The court of appeals determined that Dreier's exit from a site of

suspected illegal drug operations was significant in validating the pat down.'
139 ldaho at 250-51, 76 P.3d at 994-95. The court specifically emphasized that:
The officer's encounter with Dreier occurred at a home subject to
search for suspected drug manufacturing activity. The danger
posed to the safety of an officer conducting a search of premises
suspected of housing an illegal drug operation is increased by the
presence of a person found on the premises, who may be involved
in the criminal activities therein. See State v. Pierce, 137 ldaho
296, 299-300,47 P.3d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. App. 2002) (The threat of
violence to officers conducting a search of home suspected of
1

The fact that an officer on the scene was aware that Dreier was a frequent
visitor to the home and that he was known to carry a weapon was also
considered by the court in its totality of the circumstances inquiry. Additionally,
the court noted "nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the
officer's reasonable belief' that Dreier may have been armed and dangerous.
When asked whether he had any weapons, Dreier had motioned to his side and
indicated that he did. The officer then recovered a Leatherman tool from Dreier.

housing an illegal drug operation is greater because of the
recognized propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to
carry firearms.). See also United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The possible danger presented by an
individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug
operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an
objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under
the circumstances.").
Id. at 250, 76 P.3d at 994.
Here, Agent Sotka knew that a drug transaction had recently occurred in
the residence, which led him to conclude that his and the other officers' safety
was endangered as a result. (Tr., p. 54, L. 18 - p. 57, L. 3.) Moreover, it was
reasonable for the agent to believe Crooks had some connection to or
involvement with those transactions.

Like Dreier, Crooks was present in a

private residence associated with illegal drug activity. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 15-17.)
Furthermore, Agent Sotka was assisting in a probation search while waiting for a
search warrant to be issued, and knew that Crooks was in company of persons
known to be associated with drug activity as well as in the presence of a person
who was on felony probation. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 1-20.) Thus, from an objective
point of view at the inception of the encounter, it was reasonable for the agent to
associate Crooks with the suspected criminal activity occurring on the premises.
These facts validate the frisk.

The evidence of drug activity at the

residence, Crooks' presence inside the residence and his association with its
occupants, one of whom was a known felon, establish the requisite suspicion that
Crooks was armed and dangerous at the inception of the frisk. Because drug
crimes are often accompanied by weapons use, and the need to promptly
neutralize this risk is crucial to officer safety, the frisk was legally justified.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dale Francis Crooks'
conviction and sentence.

DATED this 6th day of July 2010.
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